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ARTICLES
THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES:
IMMIGRATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
ANGELA M. BANKS†
Human rights activists describe United States deportation
law and policy as draconian and unjust. These activists are not
alone; outrage by everyday people is expressed in response to
stories like that of Mary Anne Gehris. Mary Anne Gehris
immigrated to the United States at eighteen months old and has
lived in the South ever since.1 She married, had two children,
one with cerebral palsy, and considered America her home. At
the age of twenty-two Mary Anne pulled another women’s hair
during a fight over a boyfriend. She was charged with a
misdemeanor—simple battery.2
On the advice of a public
3
defender, she pleaded guilty. She was given a one-year sentence
that was suspended and received one-year probation, which she
successfully completed.4 Almost a decade later, Mary Anne
applied to become a United States citizen, and she noted her
misdemeanor conviction on her application. One year after
submitting her citizenship application, Mary Anne received a
letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. She
thought she was finally getting the date of her citizenship
†
Assistant Professor, William & Mary School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School,
M.Litt. University of Oxford, B.A. Spelman College. For comments, advice, and
discussion, I am grateful to the participants in the Washington & Lee Faculty
Workshop, the Immigration Law Teachers Workshop, Lan Cao, Nancy Combs, Deep
Gulasekaram, Alan Hyde, Linda Malone, and Peter Spiro. I would also like to thank
the following graduate research fellows for their assistance: Gregory Albert, Sharon
Cordello, Amanda Ritucci-Chinni, and Carrie Pixler.
1
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Ray of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at
A15; Press Release, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Mary Anne Gehris
Receives a Full Pardon (Mar. 2, 2000), available at http://oldweb.pap.state.ga.us/
NewRelea.nsf/0/561F933BDA945727852568D50069908F?OpenDocument.
2
Stephen Davis, Deported from America, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at 14,
15.
3
Lewis, supra note 1.
4
Id.; Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, supra note 1.
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ceremony.5 She was mistaken; the letter informed her that she
was to be deported.6 By 1999 her simple battery conviction made
her deportable as an aggravated felon.7 The 1996 immigration
reforms created new deportation grounds, which included Mary
Anne’s 1988 hair pulling fight, and made those grounds
retroactive.8 The fact that Mary Anne’s entire family resided in
the United States, that she was responsible for caring for a sick
child, that she knew no other country, and that her simple
battery conviction was not a deportable offense at the time she
pleaded guilty could not save her. Once Mary Anne was found to
have committed a deportable offense, there was virtually no
opportunity for her to challenge the deportation decision as a
violation of her fundamental rights.
One might ask, where are the courts and the Constitution?
Why is it that the courts do not invalidate such results on the
basis of well-established constitutional guarantees such as
proportionality, family privacy, or protection against ex post facto
laws that apply to citizens and noncitizens alike? The primary
answer to that question resides in the Supreme Court’s plenary
power doctrine. This doctrine dictates that “Congress and the
executive branch have exclusive decision-making authority
without judicial oversight for constitutionality” when regulating
immigration.9
The plenary power doctrine rests on the
assumption that anything related to immigration is a question of
national sovereignty and foreign affairs. As a consequence, the
plenary power doctrine respects the broad authority of the
legislative and executive branches to regulate immigration.
Although some monitoring role for the courts has been carved out
of this doctrine, it is a limited role that focuses on procedural due
process.10
5

Lewis, supra note 1.
Id.
7
Id. Mary Anne was subsequently pardoned by the Georgia Board of Pardons
and Paroles. Immigration and Naturalization Services, the agency then responsible
for making deportation decisions, then concluded that deportation was no longer
required. Id.
8
The relevant acts are the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
9
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2006).
10
Courts have been known to creatively characterize legal challenges in the
area of immigration as procedural in order to provide more robust judicial review.
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
6
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The Constitution, however, is not the only source of rights in
the immigration context. The United States has ratified human
rights treaties that seem on their face to provide much needed
protection to immigrants. As a consequence, human rights
activists and international law scholars have called for judges to
review challenges to deportation decisions in light of these
treaties. They do so in the hope that greater judicial enforcement
of U.S. human rights treaty obligations will create a more robust
judicial role in monitoring deportation decisions. In particular, it
is hoped that recourse to human rights treaties and the
jurisprudence of human rights bodies interpreting those treaties
will undermine the strength and legitimacy of the plenary power
doctrine.
Within the human rights literature, domestic
enforcement is considered one of the most effective tools for
ensuring treaty compliance.11 While I generally agree with this
proposition, in the immigration context, it fails to recognize that
the very doctrines that would allow U.S. courts to review human
rights treaty claims are the doctrines that require judicial
deference to the political actors. From the beginning of our
republic through the mid-nineteenth century, the federal
government used “friendship, commerce, and navigation” treaties
to regulate immigration. Part I of the Article examines the
connection between the Court’s treaty enforcement jurisprudence
and its deferential stance in immigration cases. This Part
demonstrates that a key principle underlying the Court’s treaty
enforcement doctrines—maintaining flexibility when addressing
national soveriengty issues—was transferred to the immigration
context.
From this analysis it becomes evident that the
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1628
(1992).
11
See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT; LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1087–96 (3d
ed. 2008); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 497 (2005) (“[M]uch of international law
is obeyed primarily because domestic institutions create mechanisms for ensuring
that a state abides by its international legal commitments whether or not particular
governmental actors wish it to do so.”); Christof H. Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The
Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23
HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 483 (2001); Shayana Kadidal, “Federalizing” Immigration Law:
International Law as a Limitation on Congress’s Power To Legislate in the Field of
Immigration, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 515–16 (2008); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656–57 (1997); Kenneth
Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1
CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 350–51 (2000).
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principles of judicial treaty enforcement are unlikely to inhibit
the plenary power doctrine because they actually informed the
very development of that doctrine.
Part II reconceptualizes the relationship between the Court’s
plenary power doctrine and treaty enforcement jurisprudence as
developing reinforcing strategies for maintaining American
flexibility when addressing national sovereignty issues. More
particularly, Part II shows that those who believe that treaties
can provide an effective basis for restricting the United States
immigration power ignore significant challenges relating both to
the status of the relevant treaties as well as the Court’s historical
reluctance to enforce U.S. treaty obligations in the face of
conflicting or contradictory federal action.
The very real obstacles that identified in Part II could be
ameliorated, as discussed at the end of that Part, but that leads
to the exploration in Part III of perhaps the most formidable
hurdle to the effective use of treaties to create structures of
judicial monitoring of immigration decisions: the problems of
framing and indeterminacy. “Indeterminacy” refers to the fact
that the obligations contained in treaties rarely dictate specific
outcomes. Rather, the treaty articulates a combination of rules
and standards that grant State parties and adjudicators varying
degrees of discretion to determine what constitutes compliance.
This creates indeterminacy as to the required outcome in cases
alleging treaty violations.12 Consequently, the frames used by
decision makers to analyze the treaty claims are more
determinative than the treaty standards. Frames are thought
organizers. They focus our attention on certain events, their
causes and consequences, and obscure other events, causes, and
consequences.
For instance, the deportation decisions of
European States and international and regional treaty bodies use
proportionality review to balance an individual’s right to family
life and the State’s interest in regulating migration.13 They do so
in large part because proportionality review fits with the
dominant features of the legal tool kit that these adjudicators
12
It is not my contention that human rights treaties suffer from absolute
indeterminacy but rather that the use of standards creates a certain amount of
indeterminacy due to the discretion given to decision makers. I do not have broader
indeterminacy concerns because I contend that law as an institution provides certain
constraints on legal decision makers. See infra text accompanying notes 182–94.
13
Throughout this Article, I use the term “State” to refer to sovereign states and
the term “state” to refer to the political sub-divisions within the United States.
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rely upon when applying the rules and standards governing
individual rights. A different set of features are dominant within
the legal tool kit relied upon by U.S. adjudicators, and they
consequently lead to a different application of similar rules and
standards. Thus, because treaty standards are not determinative
and because the frames used by adjudicators significantly
influence the outcome of the case, the application of treaty
standards to the immigration context would have no meaningful
effect. Changing the source of law that U.S. judges are analyzing
will not avoid or minimize the role that frames play. U.S.
adjudicators would continue to use the same frames that give
rise to significant judicial deference and would thereby reach the
same substantive outcomes.
This Article therefore concludes that greater judicial
enforcement of human rights treaties in the United States will
not enhance judicial monitoring of deportation decisions. Despite
the popularity of this approach within the human rights
literature, its effectiveness within a specific State depends upon
how treaty compliance is allocated within the State and the
frames used to analyze the legal questions at issue. That said,
treaty body jurisprudence and foreign treaty-based jurisprudence
can demonstrate alternative uses of the tools within our legal tool
kit and can thereby encourage Americans to rethink the validity
and appropriateness of the frames currently utilized. But
overestimating the influence of treaty jurisprudence will waste
resources and blind us to other more efficacious mechanisms for
enhancing oversight of deportation decisions.
I.

IMMIGRATION, TREATIES, AND DEFERENCE

There is a great irony in the claim that greater judicial
enforcement of U.S. human rights obligations will increase
judicial monitoring of deportation decisions. The historical use of
treaties to regulate immigration enabled the U.S. Supreme Court
to understand immigration as a foreign affairs issue.
Consequently, the Court applied a key principle underlying its
treaty enforcement jurisprudence in immigration cases. This
principle dictates that the government should have maximum
flexibility when making foreign affairs decisions, which are
inherently political. Maintaining such flexibility in the face of
treaty breach allegations and claims of constitutional violations
requires judicial restraint and deference to political decision
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makers. This is the essence of the plenary power doctrine.
Relying on judicial enforcement of human rights treaties to
increase judicial review of deportation decisions actually
reinforces the need for judicial restraint and deference.
A.

Regulating Immigration with Treaties

Historically, treaties have played a significant role in the
regulation of immigration in the United States, and the use of
this legal tool has played an important role in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s review of immigration decisions. Although the Alien Acts
of 179814 were enacted soon after our nation’s founding, many
believe that the federal government did little to regulate
migration until the 1875 Page Act.15 This act prohibited the
admission of “women for the purposes of prostitution,”
involuntary Asian laborers, and convicts.16 Yet within this
seventy-five year time period, the federal government regulated
admission to the United States through treaties, specifically
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties (“FCN treaties”).17
Through these treaties, the United States provided for the
admission and residence of specific noncitizens. To promote
foreign commerce, the United States entered into FCN treaties
that allowed the citizens, subjects, or inhabitants of the foreign
State to enter and reside in the United States. Treaty provisions
such as the following from the FCN treaty with Austria-Hungary
were common:
14
The Alien Acts of 1798 empowered the President of the United States to
deport noncitizens who were “dangerous to the welfare of the nation.” THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 160 (2008). These acts were set to expire in 1800. Between 1798 and 1800,
the President never used his authority under these acts to deport noncitizens. The
Alien Acts of 1798 were the first federal legislative action regulating migration, but
Congress passed the first naturalization law in 1790.
15
See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 161 (“For the next 75 years, the
federal government did little about the regulation of immigration.”); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833, 1894–96 (1993) (discussing state regulation of migration in the late
eighteenth and early ninteenth centuries).
16
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (1875) (repealed 1974) (also
referred to as the Page Act).
17
Neuman, supra note 15, at 1894. Within this category, I am including treaties
that governed each of these three topics. All of the relevant treaties referred to two
or more of the following terms: amity, friendship, commerce, or navigation. The
seventy-five year period refers to the time the Alien Friends Act expired in 1800 and
the enactment of the Page Act. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 14.
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The inhabitants of their respective States shall mutually have
liberty to enter the ports, places and rivers of the territories of
each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall
be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of
said territories, in order to attend to their commercial
affairs . . . .18

18
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Austria-Hung., art. I, Aug. 27,
1829, reprinted in 1 WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL
ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
OTHER POWERS 1776–1909, S. DOC. No. 357, at 30 (1910) [hereinafter 1 MALLOY
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS]; see also Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.Japan, art. I, Nov. 22, 1894, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS,
supra, at 1028–29; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Congo, art. I,
Jan. 24, 1891, reprinted 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 328–29;
Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Serb., art. I, Oct. 14, 1881, reprinted
in 2 WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS,
PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
OTHER POWERS 1776–1909, S. DOC. No. 357, at 1613 (1910) [hereinafter 2 MALLOY
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS]; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, art. I,
Feb. 26, 1871, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 969–70;
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Consular Privileges, U.S.-Salvador, art. III, Dec. 6,
1870, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1551–52; Treaty
of Friendship Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., art. II, June 21, 1867,
reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1279–80; Convention of
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation and for the Surrender of Fugitive Criminals,
U.S.-Dom. Rep., art. III, Feb. 8, 1867, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES &
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 403–04; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
U.S.-Hond., art. II, July 4, 1864, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS,
supra, at 952–53; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Liber., art. II, Oct. 21,
1862, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1050–51; Treaty
of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Bol., art. III, May 13, 1858,
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 113–14; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Arg. Rep., arts. I, IX, July 27, 1853,
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 20–21, 23; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Peru, art. II, July 26, 1851, reprinted
in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1388–89; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Costa Rica, art. II, July 10, 1851, reprinted in 1
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 341–42; Convention of Friendship,
Commerce, and Extradition, U.S.-Switz., art. I, Nov. 25, 1850, reprinted in 2
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1763–64; Convention of Amity,
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Borneo, art. II, June 23, 1850, reprinted in 1
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 130–31; Treaty of Peace, Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Guat., art. III, Mar. 3, 1849, reprinted in 1 MALLOY
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 861–62; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation,
U.S.-Port., art. I, Aug. 26, 1840, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS,
supra, at 1452–53; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Hanover, art. I, May
20, 1840, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 885–86;
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce, U.S.-Ecuador, art. III, June
13, 1839, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 421–22;
Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Sardinia, art. I, Nov. 26, 1838,
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The United States began entering into these treaties as early as
1778, and by the time the Supreme Court was asked to review
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, treaties represented a significant
form of federal immigration regulation.19 Between 1778 and
1889, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the first major case
challenging the federal immigration power, the United States
had entered into FCN treaties with thirty-seven States.20 Treaty
partners included States as diverse as Italy, Serbia, Mexico,
Prussia, Liberia, Japan, and Orange Free State.21
The United States entered into a similar treaty with China
in 1868, which became the basis for legal challenges to antiChinese California laws and the federal Chinese Exclusion Acts.

reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1603–04; Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Greece, art. I, Dec. 22, 1837, reprinted in 1 MALLOY
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 848–49; Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce,
and Navigation, U.S.-Venez., art. III, Jan. 20, 1836, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES
& CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1831–32; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.Russ., art. I, Dec. 18, 1832, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra,
at 1514–15; Convention of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Chile, art.
III, May 16, 1832, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 171–
72; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Mex., art. III, Apr. 5, 1831,
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1085–86; Treaty of
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Braz., art. III, Dec. 12, 1828, reprinted in 1
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 133–34; Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation, U.S.-Prussia, art. I, May 1, 1828, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES &
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1496; Convention of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, U.S.-Den., art. II, Apr. 26, 1826, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES &
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 373–74; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Swed.-Nor.,
art. I, Sept. 4, 1816, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at
1742–43; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, July 3,
1815, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 624–25.
19
In 1778, the United States entered into a treaty of amity and commerce with
France. See 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931); see also Neuman, supra note 15, at 1894–96.
20
1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at ix–xxi.
21
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. I, Nov. 22, 1894,
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1028–29; Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Serbia, art. I, Oct. 14, 1881, reprinted in 2
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1613; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Extradition, U.S.-Orange Free State, art. I, Dec. 22, 1871, reprinted
in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1310; Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, art. I, Feb. 26, 1871, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES &
CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 969–70; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.Liber., art I, Oct. 21, 1862, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra
note 18, at 1050; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Mex., art. III,
Apr. 5, 1831, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at
1085–86; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Prussia, art. I, May 1, 1828,
reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1496.
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In 1868 the United States entered into the Burlingame Treaty
with China,22 which recognized the “inalienable right of man to
change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage
of the free migration and emigration of [Chinese] citizens.”23 To
realize the benefits of migration, the parties agreed that “Chinese
subjects visiting or residing in the United [sic] shall enjoy the
same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel
or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of
the most favored nation.”24
Significant Chinese migration began in the mid-nineteenth
century, which was a time when there was a great need for labor
in the West due to the California Gold Rush and construction of
the transcontinental railroad.25 The Burlingame Treaty was
enacted to facilitate Chinese immigration to meet this need for
inexpensive labor.
By the 1870s, however, anti-Chinese sentiment hardened
when American workers blamed Chinese laborers for taking jobs
and depressing wages.26 As economic tension increased so did
concerns regarding assimilation. As Justice Field noted in Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, “[t]he differences of race added
greatly to the difficulties of the situation. . . .
It seemed
impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living.”27 In response to these
concerns, California began enacting laws limiting the economic
opportunities available to Chinese laborers.28 When local laws of
22

MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 16.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 592 (1889).
24
Id. at 593.
25
MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 15. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the
Court noted that “for some years little opposition was made to [Chinese laborers],
except when they sought to work in the mines, but, as their numbers increased, they
began to engage in various mechanical pursuits and trades, and thus came in
competition with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.”
130 U.S. at 594.
26
MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 16.
27
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.
28
For example, San Francisco enacted an ordinance in 1880 regulating the
location of laundries. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
ordinance was only enforced against Chinese individuals operating laundries and as
such was a violation of Fourteenth Amendment. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). In 1852,
California enacted a Foreign Miners License Tax that required noncitizens to have a
license that cost $3.00 per month. This rate was increased periodically reaching
$20.00 per month by 1870. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, THE
CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA: SOME STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND
CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO ANTI-CHINESE LEGISLATION AND SUBSEQUENT ACTION
23
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this type were challenged, the federal courts declared them
unconstitutional or in violation of the Burlingame Treaty.29
In 1882 Congress took action and enacted the first of several
Chinese Exclusion Laws. The 1882 law suspended the entry of
Chinese laborers for ten years but did not apply to Chinese
laborers present in the United States as of November 17, 1880 or
those arriving within ninety days after the passage of the act.30
To enforce these provisions, Chinese laborers eligible to remain
in the United States had to obtain a certificate upon their
departure from the United States that would facilitate their
return.31 The certificate was evidence of eligibility to be admitted
to the United States under the terms of the 1882 Chinese
Exclusion Act.32 Enforcement of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act
became difficult because individuals were allowed entry into the
United States based on evidence of prior residence other than the
government-issued certificate. Significant concerns regarding
fraud lead to the enactment of the 1884 Chinese Exclusion Act.
This act made the government-issued certificate the only valid
evidence for establishing a Chinese laborer’s eligibility to reenter
the United States.33 The 1884 revisions were still not deemed
sufficient to address the concerns of Congress, and in 1888

(2006) [hereinafter THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE], available at http://teaching
resources.atlas.uiuc.edu/chinese_exp/resources/resource_2_4.pdf. In 1855, the state
adopted “An Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons Who Cannot
Become Citizens,” and San Francisco introduced a tax of $50.00 per person for any
individual attempting to dock in California who was not eligible for naturalization.
Id. At this time, only blacks and whites were eligible to naturalize and become U.S.
citizens. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 43
(2006). In 1879, California’s constitution prohibited corporations and municipalities
from hiring Chinese individuals and it authorized cities to remove Chinese residents
from the city limits to specific remote areas. THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE, supra.
29
Each of the acts discussed in note 28 were held unconstitutional. THE
CHINESE EXPERIENCE, supra note 28.
30
Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 3, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1882
Chinese Exclusion Act]; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 599.
31
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 30, § 4.
32
Id.
33
Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1884
Chinese Exclusion Act]; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 25–26 (noting that it
was hard to enforce the Chinese Exclusion Act “because it was not clear who was
exempt as a returning Chinese immigrant who had originally arrived in the United
States before the effective date of the ten-year moratorium”). See generally RONALD
TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS
79–131 (1989).
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Congress enacted another Chinese Exclusion Act, which
prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the United States
even if they had a certificate.34
It was this last Chinese Exclusion Act that was challenged in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States. Immigration scholars and
students are familiar with the constitutional claims raised in
Chae Chan Ping, but what is often overlooked is that Chae Chan
Ping also challenged the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act as a
violation of the 1880 treaty between the United States and China
(the “1880 Treaty”), which modified the Burlingame Treaty.35
Chae Chan Ping had resided in San Francisco, California from
1875 until June 1887 when he traveled to China. When he
departed, he had a certificate that, pursuant to the 1882 and
1884 Chinese Exclusion Acts, permitted his admission to the
United States upon his return.36 While Chae Chan Ping was
away, the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted, which
prohibited his entry into the United States despite his possession
of a certificate of identity. He arrived back in San Francisco on
October 8, 1888, just seven days after the passage of the 1888
Chinese Exclusion Act.37
Chae Chan Ping argued that, pursuant to the Burlingame
Treaty and the 1880 Treaty, he acquired property and liberty
rights that enabled him to return, reside, and work in the United
States and that these rights could not be limited through
subsequent legislation.38 This argument was based on the
34
Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1888
Chinese Exclusion Act]. The law provided that “it shall be unlawful for any chinese
laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now or hereafter be,
a resident within the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart,
therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to, or
remain in, the United States.” Id at 504.
35
See Treaty Concerning Imigration, U.S.-China, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826
[hereinafter 1880 Treaty]; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599–600
(1889) (“The validity of this act, as already mentioned, is assailed, as being in effect
an expulsion from the country of Chinese laborers, in violation of existing treaties
between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in
them under the laws of congress.”). The 1880 Treaty was ratified in 1881. 1880
Treaty, supra, at 826. The 1880 Treaty allowed the United States to “regulate, limit,
or suspend” the immigration or residence of Chinese nationals, but the treaty stated
that the United States could not absolutely prohibit such migration. Id.
36
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
37
Id.
38
Brief for Appellant at 18, Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (No. 1446)
[hereinafter Hoadly & Carter Brief]; Brief for Appellant at 2, Chae Chan Ping, 130
U.S. 581 (No. 1446) [hereinafter Brown & Riordan Brief].
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Court’s prior case law upholding treaty-based property rights
when they conflicted with state law.39 The Court’s response to
the treaty-based claims helps to explain the development of the
plenary power doctrine.40
Chae Chan Ping encountered an unreceptive court partly
because he claimed that the federal government, rather than one
of the states, violated his treaty-based rights. By the late 1800s,
the Court was willing to police state action to ensure compliance
with U.S. treaty obligations, but the Court was not willing to
place the same restraints on the federal government. Due to
concerns about institutional competence, the Court deferred to
political branch decisionmaking regarding treaty compliance.41
Chae Chan Ping’s treaty compliance arguments were based
on the Court’s jurisprudence developed in Ware v. Hylton.42 In
this case, the Court had to determine whether or not a provision
in the 1783 Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great
Britain was superseded by Virginia law. The peace treaty stated
that “creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of
all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”43 In 1777, Virginia law
allowed one to repay British debt with an equivalent amount of
Virginia paper currency.44 The depreciation of the Virginia
pound made this an attractive repayment option.45 Five years
later, Virginia went further by enacting legislation stating that
“no debt or demand whatsoever, originally due to a subject of
Great Britain, shall be recoverable in any court in this

39

See infra text accompanying notes 42–59.
See infra text accompanying notes 42–59.
41
The Court’s understanding of institutional competence with regard to foreign
affairs was influenced by separation of powers norms articulated in the U.S.
Constitution. See also infra text accompanying notes 54–56.
42
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Chae Chan Ping also argued that the Burlingame
Treaty and the 1880 Treaty operated as contracts under which he obtained the right
to return to and reside in the United States. This Article focuses on the role of
judicial treaty enforcement as an explanation of the plenary power doctrine and for
evaluating modern claims for greater judicial treaty enforcement in immigration.
Therefore, the treaty as contract arguments are not examined.
43
Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 602 (2007) (quoting Definitive
Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, 8 Stat. 80 (1783)).
44
Id. (citing An Act for Sequestering British Property (1777), in AT A GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CAPITOL, IN THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 17
(Williamsburg, Alexander Purdie 1778)).
45
Id.
40
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commonwealth.”46 This act prevented the United States from
complying with article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace. A British
creditor challenged the Virginia laws as a violation of the 1783
Treaty of Peace and the Supreme Court upheld the treaty rights
of the creditor.47 Justice Chase, in the main opinion, notes that
“[i]t is the declared will of the people of the United States that
every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be
superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual State.”48
Ware marks the beginning of the Court’s treaty enforcement
jurisprudence vis-à-vis state action.49 It is this jurisprudence
that Chae Chan Ping called upon in discussing Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven.50 This case involved a
tension between property rights pursuant to New Haven rules
and the 1783 Treaty of Peace. Chae Chan Ping’s inclusion of this
case to support his argument that treaty-based rights cannot be
divested by Congress failed to appreciate the distinction that the
Court had made by 1884 between alleged state treaty breaches
and alleged congressional treaty breaches. The Head Money
Cases were decided in 1884, and the Court boldly concluded that,
when faced with congressional action that allegedly violated U.S.
treaty obligations, the congressional action will be upheld by the
judiciary.51 Articulating the last-in-time doctrine, the Court drew
upon previous circuit court decisions addressing the same issue—
a tension between a congressional act and a previously ratified
treaty.52 In all of these cases, the courts recognized that treaties
and federal statutes are on equal footing, so the most recent

46
Id. (quoting An Act To Repeal So Much of a Former Act as Suspends the
Issuing of Executions Upon Certain Judgments Until December, One Thousand
Seven Hundred and Eighty Three (1782), reprinted in 11 WILLIAM WALLER HENING,
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 76
(Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1823)).
47
Id. at 604.
48
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796).
49
See Wu, supra note 43, at 584.
50
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823).
51
Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884) (“We are
of opinion that, so far as the provisions in that act may be found to be in conflict with
any treaty with a foreign nation, they must prevail in all the judicial courts of this
country.”).
52
See id. at 597–98 (citing Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855);
In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883); In re Clinton Bridge (The Clinton Bridge
Case), 5 F. Cas. 1060 (C.C.D. Iowa 1867); Ropes v. Clinch, 20 F. Cas. 1171
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871); Bartram v. Robertson, 15 F. 212 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883)).
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expression of the sovereign controls. Just as Congress can repeal
or amend previously enacted statutes, it can similarly “repeal” or
modify treaty obligations within the United States.53
By adopting the last-in-time doctrine, the Court decided that
Congress has the power to determine the effect of treaties within
the United States.54 Despite the existence of a treaty obligation,
the last-in-time doctrine states that Congress can decide that a
treaty has no legal effect within the United States by enacting
conflicting legislation. The Court could have concluded that due
to the United States’ international legal obligations, Congress
does not have the authority to enact legislation that would cause
the United States to abrogate a treaty obligation.55 This is
essentially the approach the Court took when state legislation
conflicted with a treaty obligation. The Court did not take this
route and instead concluded that Congress has the authority to
enact conflicting legislation. The last-in-time doctrine reflects a
strategy for maintaining flexibility when regulating issues that
implicate national sovereignty. Here, Congress, rather than the
judiciary, is recognized as the entity that ultimately decides
whether a treaty or conflicting domestic law will have the force of
law within the United States.56 The plenary power doctrine
similarly maintains flexibility for the political branches when
regulating national sovereignty issues. While the last-in-time
53
Id. at 599 (“[S]o far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign
nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it
is subject to such acts as congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or
repeal.”); see also infra note 98 for a discussion about the different domestic and
international effects of such congressional action.
54
This reflects judicial deference to Congress on this issue. See also Wu, supra
note 43, at 581–82, 608–11.
55
The general principle within international law, pacta sunt servanda, could
support such a conclusion based on the idea that only the entity authorized to enter
into a treaty has the authority to abrogate a treaty obligation. Attempted abrogation
by any other entity is simply a failure to perform the treaty in good faith. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 321.
56
The executive branch also plays a role here in either signing the congressional
legislation into law or by signing a new treaty, which requires the advice and
consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Additionally while the last-in-time
doctrine prioritizes the most recent legal act, commentators have noted that courts
rarely enforce later ratified treaties despite being the most recent expression from
the sovereign. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 422 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953); 1 WESTEL
WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 555
(1st ed. 1910); Wu, supra note 43, at 595–97 (discussing Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102 (1933)).
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doctrine allows Congress to determine what the governing
domestic law will be, the plenary power doctrine lets Congress
and the executive decide how the law will be implemented.
When individuals raise substantive constitutional challenges to
immigration law or decisions, the courts provide very minimal
review due to the deference accorded to the political branches
pursuant to the plenary power doctrine.
Chae Chan Ping acknowledged that Congress could prohibit
the future immigration of Chinese laborers despite the
Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty but argued that
Congress could not divest previously granted treaty rights.57
This is where the property rights cases play a significant role in
Chae Chan Ping’s arguments. In a line of cases addressing the
tension between state property laws and treaty-based property
rights, courts concluded that as long as property rights were
acquired pursuant to a valid treaty, the subsequent repeal or
termination of the treaty does not divest the previously acquired
property rights.58 In cases like Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel v. Town of New Haven, the Court noted that,
it would be most mischievous to admit, that the extinguishment
of the treaty extinguished the right to such estate. In truth, it
no more affects such rights, than the repeal of a municipal law
affects rights acquired under it. If, for example, a statute of
descents be repealed, it has never been supposed, that rights of
property already vested during its existence, were gone by such
repeal. Such a construction would overturn the best established
doctrines of law, and sap the very foundation on which property
rests.59

Chae Chan Ping thus argued that even if Congress had the
power, as articulated in the Head Money Cases, to “repeal” the
Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty, it could not divest Chae
Chan Ping of the migration rights he acquired under these
treaties. In response to Chae Chan Ping’s treaty-based claims,
the United States recognized that the 1888 Chinese Exclusion
Act was inconsistent with the Treaty but stated that this act
successfully repealed the 1880 Treaty. Relying on the 1798
congressional repeal of U.S. treaties with France, the Head
57
Hoadly & Carter Brief, supra note 38, at 17 (citing The Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. at 598–99).
58
Id. at 18–19.
59
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 493–94 (1823).
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Money Cases and its progeny, the United States argued that
Congress has the power to repeal treaties because the
Constitution grants treaties and federal statutes the same
status—“the supreme Law of the Land.”60 Just as Congress can
repeal or modify federal statutes, it can do the same with
treaties. Invoking the last-in-time rule, the United States argued
that when faced with an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty
and a federal statute, the most recent provision will control.61
Since the Chinese Exclusion Acts post-dated the 1880 Treaty, the
federal statutes repealed the treaty.62 The United States did not
directly engage Chae Chan Ping’s argument that Congress
lacked the power to divest rights previously granted by treaty
even after such treaty is repealed or terminated. Rather, the
United States focused on the power of Congress to repeal a treaty
through subsequent legislation and characterized the treaty
provisions regarding migration as extending privileges that can
be taken away.63 The United States’ arguments prevailed.
Treaties also formed the basis for the claims in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, which decided the scope of the State’s
power to deport noncitizens.64 This case challenged the 1892
Chinese Exclusion Act, which extended the 1888 Chinese
Exclusion Act for an additional ten years and required all
Chinese laborers within the United States to obtain a certificate
of residence.65 Failure to have a certificate of residence was
60

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
But see Wu, supra note 43, at 596 (noting that the Court has only once held
that a more recent treaty controls pursuant to this rule; in all other instances, this
rule is used to enforce a more recent federal statute).
62
Brief for the United States at 10–11, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446) [hereinafter U.S. Chae Chan Ping Brief].
63
The United States argued that
the reply is that he held his exceptional privileges only by virtue of the laws
which then existed, but which have since been repealed; and as there is no
law extending to him those privileges, the privileges died with the law. The
law gave him the privilege, and the repeal of the law has taken it away;
and he has no rights greater than any other non-resident of the same class.
Id. at 14. Similar arguments were presented in the brief submitted by the State of
California. Brief by Counsel Appointed by the State of California in Support of the
Contention of the United States at 1–2, Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (No. 1446)
[hereinafter California Chae Chan Ping Brief]. This brief forcefully presents the
treaty migration provisions as the grant of privileges rather than rights. As
privileges, they are “not of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice.” Id. at 2.
64
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
65
Act of May 5, 1882, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1892
Chinese Exclusion Act].
61
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grounds for deportation.66 The regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Treasury stated that in order to obtain a
certificate of residence, a Chinese laborer must provide an
affidavit “of at least one credible witness of good character”
attesting to the Chinese laborer’s residence and lawful status
within the United States.67 If a Chinese laborer was found
without the required certificate, the individual would have the
opportunity to prove to the satisfaction of the court and “by at
least one credible white witness, that he was a resident of the
United States at the time of the passage of this act.”68 If these
requirements were met, a certificate of residence would be
issued.69
Fong Yue Ting arose after three Chinese laborers were
arrested and detained for failure to have the required certificate
of residence. One petitioner was denied the certificate because
he was unable to produce a credible witness to attest his
residence and lawful status.70 The only witnesses the petitioner
could produce were Chinese, and the collector of internal
revenue—the officer issuing the certificates—concluded that
these witnesses were not credible.71 The collector required the
petitioner to “produce a witness other than a Chinaman,” which
the petitioner was unable to do because “there was no person
other than one of the Chinese race who knew and could
truthfully swear that he was lawfully within the United States
on May 5, 1892, and then entitled to remain” in the United
States.72
The petitioners in this case not only argued that they were
arrested and detained without due process of law in violation of
the Fifth Amendment but also that the Chinese Exclusion Acts
violated the Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty.73 The
Burlingame Treaty not only granted Chinese laborers lawful
residence in the United States,74 but it ensured that they would
66

Id. § 6.
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 701 n.2.
68
1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 65, § 6.
69
Id.
70
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 703.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 703–04.
73
Brief for Appellants at 5–6, Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (Nos. 1345, 1346,
1347) [hereinafter Choate & Evarts Brief].
74
Id. at 12. The treaty “recognized [Chinese nationals’] inalienable right to
change their allegiance and residence and to come and settle [in the United States],
67
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be granted the same rights as United States citizens. The 1880
Treaty provided that Chinese laborers would have the same
“rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions” that were
granted to the citizens of the most favored nation.75 At the time
that this treaty was ratified, the United States granted the
citizens of Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium the right to
enter and reside in the United States and “the same rights in
respect to their property, commerce, trade, and industry, and to
receive the same protection and security for their persons and
property as the native-born inhabitants or other citizens of the
United States.”76 Petitioners therefore argued that pursuant to
these treaties, Chinese laborers were entitled to the same right
to reside in the United States as United States citizens.77 Since
citizens are protected from deportation, Chinese laborers residing
in the United States pursuant to the Burlingame Treaty were
similarly protected from deportation.78 Thus section 6 of the
1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, which provided for the deportation
of Chinese laborers who could not establish by “at least one
credible white witness” that he was a United States resident at
the time the act was enacted, violated the Burlingame Treaty
and the 1880 Treaty.
By the mid-1800s, the Court began to recognize immigration
regulation as a federal prerogative and started to limit the ability
of states to regulate admission through substantive restrictions
or taxes.79 When the Court came to review the Chinese Exclusion
Acts, it not only understood immigration regulation to be a
federal power, but it understood that treaties were the
mechanism by which that power was exercised. This connection

and the Treaty of 1880 finding them so here guaranteed their right to remain here,
and as to those then here, at any rate guaranteed them against any future
legislation for their removal.” Id.
75
Id. at 7 (quoting 1880 Treaty, supra note 35, art. II) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Chinese laborers who are now in the United States shall be allowed to go
and come of their own free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights,
privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and
subjects of the most favored nation.” (quoting 1880 Treaty, supra note 35, art. II)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
76
Brief for the Appellants at 28–29, Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (Nos. 1345,
1346, 1347) (emphasis removed) [hereinafter Ashton Brief].
77
Choate & Evarts Brief, supra note 73, at 12.
78
Id.
79
See Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 300–01, 305 (1849);
see also Neuman, supra note 15, at 1848.
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between treaties and federal immigration regulation was
significant in the development of the plenary power doctrine.
The use of treaties to regulate immigration reinforced the idea
that immigration is a foreign affairs matter. This shaped the
Court’s framing decisions, which influenced the scope of available
judicial review. As a foreign affairs issue, Congress and the
executive are entitled to judicial deference when immigration
decisions are reviewed. This reflects the Court’s concerns about
separation of powers and institutional competence. Similar
concerns led the Court to conclude that treaty compliance
decisions are political decisions left to the executive and
Congress.80 Any decision to exercise robust judicial review of
substantive constitutional challenges to immigration decisions
would create an end run around the treaty enforcement
doctrines. Congress would no longer have the final say as to
what the law is regulating immigration or how it would be
implemented—the judiciary would.
To maintain maximum
flexibility for international political decisionmaking, the Court
would need to defer to congressional and executive immigration
decisions. Yet judicial deference when faced with allegations of
unconstitutional action undermines rather than reinforces the
checks and balances provided by our separation of powers
system.81
By challenging the validity of the Chinese Exclusion Acts
based on the Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty, the Court
was asked to decide whether or not the United States was in
compliance with its treaty obligations. This is a task that the
Court historically has shied away from when congressional action
was the basis for the alleged treaty breach. Despite this
jurisprudential backdrop, Fong Yue Ting argued that the
Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty granted him, and
similarly situated Chinese laborers, the right to continued
residence in the United States and that Congress had not
repealed these treaty rights with the 1892 Chinese Exclusion
Act.82 Unlike Chae Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting did not argue that
80

See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
The Court has never indicated that the political branches are free to ignore or
disobey the Constitution. Rather, based on their obligation to uphold and defend the
Constitution, the Court seems to contend that it can rely on these branches to act in
accordance with the Constitution without judicial oversight.
82
Ashton Brief, supra note 76, at 28–30; Choate & Evarts Brief, supra note 73,
at 5–6, 12.
81
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Congress could not divest an individual of treaty-granted rights;
rather he argued that Congress had not done so. Recognizing the
last-in-time rule, the petitioners argued that Congress did not
intend to abrogate or repeal the Burlingame Treaty with the
enactment of the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act. Rather, this act
was an explicit effort by Congress to protect the Burlingame
Treaty rights of Chinese laborers.83 The Court ruled against the
Chinese petitioners, concluding that the 1892 Chinese Exclusion
Act, as the last expression of the sovereign, controlled rather
than the Burlingame Treaty or the 1880 Treaty.84
Together Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting make two
important points for judicial review of immigration decisions.
First, these cases reinforce the Court’s conclusion from the mid1800s that immigration regulation is a federal prerogative.85
Second, they remind us that Congress has the authority to repeal
prior treaty obligations. When the Court came to review the
Chinese Exclusion Acts, it understood that treaties were the
mechanism by which the immigration power was exercised.
Thus, the principles underlying the Court’s treaty enforcement
jurisprudence were influential in the development of the plenary
power doctrine.86
In Chae Chan Ping, Justice Field
acknowledged that the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act contravened
the 1880 Treaty but concluded that this did not invalidate the
1882 statute.87 Justice Field turned to standard norms and rules
regarding treaty compliance in determining the validity of the
83
Ashton Brief, supra note 76, at 30–32. The petitioners argued that there were
two classes of Chinese laborers residing in the United States at the time these cases
were heard. There were those that settled in the United States based on “the
invitation held out to them by the Burlingame Treaty,” and then there were those
who entered in contravention of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Choate & Evarts Brief,
supra note 73, at 7–8; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 750–51
(1893) (describing the strategies used by Chinese migrants to evade the first time
entry restrictions of the Chinese Exclusion Acts). With regard to the lawful Chinese
migrants, the petitioners argued that “[t]he act does not purport to take away any
rights of the laborers who came lawfully into the country under the treaties with
China and the Restriction Acts, by abrogating or repealing those treaties or those
laws, but explicitly assumes that they are rightfully here, intends that they may
remain, and proposes to legislate in regard to them as a part of the lawful population
of the United States.” Ashton Brief, supra note 76, at 31.
84
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 720–21.
85
See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Neuman, supra note 15, at 1848.
86
The plenary power doctrine dictates that “Congress and the executive branch
have exclusive decision-making authority without judicial oversight for
constitutionality” when regulating immigration. MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 27.
87
See In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28, 32 (1883).
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1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.88 Based on the last-in-time rule, the
Court concluded that the 1882 act was the controlling expression
of the sovereign.89 The fact that this legislative act constituted a
breach of the Burlingame Treaty did not factor into the Court’s
analysis. The Court’s analysis in Fong Yue Ting similarly
applied the last-in-time doctrine.90
The Court’s analysis in Chae Chan Ping focused on whether
Congress had the authority to enact the 1882 Chinese Exclusion
Act. One aspect of this analysis was whether Congress could
enact legislation that contravened U.S. treaty obligations.91
Justice Field applied the prevailing norms and rules regarding
the relationship between treaties and federal statutes—treaties
and federal statutes are on equal footing and the last-in-time will
control.92 He noted that
treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of
congress. By the constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof,
and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are
both declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no
paramount authority is given to one over the other. A treaty, it
is true, is in its nature a contract between nations, and is often
merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry
its stipulations into effect. Such legislation will be open to
future repeal or amendment. If the treaty operates by its own
force, and relates to a subject within the power of congress, it
can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a
legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of

88

See id. at 29–30.
See id. at 30. In this case, the Circuit Court for the District of California was
faced with a challenge from an individual born in Hong Kong who claimed
exemption from the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. At the time that the petitioner was
born in Hong Kong, it was under British control. Petitioner argued that as a British
subject, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act should not apply to him. Id. at 29. The court
concluded that the act was meant to cover all individuals who because of their “race,
language, and color” are Chinese. Id. at 29, 31. Justice Field went on to reference the
last-in-time rule, stating that “[w]hether a treaty has been violated by our
legislation, so as to be the proper occasion of complaint by the foreign government, is
not a judicial question. To the courts it is simply the case of conflicting laws, the last
modifying or superseding the earlier.” Id. at 30.
90
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720–21 (1893).
91
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
92
Id.
89
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congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will
must control.93

Quoting the Head Money Cases, the Court stated “so far as a
treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can
become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this
country, it is subject to such acts as congress may pass for its
enforcement, modification, or repeal.”94
The Court has sought to maintain maximum flexibility for
the United States when conducting foreign affairs. According to
the Court, States have a sovereign right to breach treaty
obligations, but breaches have consequences. A breaching State
may be subject to countermeasures or liable for damages.95 A
State’s decision to open itself up to such liability is a political
decision that courts should not second guess. The Court’s treaty
enforcement jurisprudence reflects the Court’s unwillingness to
enter this political quagmire.96 Treaty enforcement is a task that
is shared by the judiciary and the political branches of
government. Vis-à-vis the states, courts are responsible for
ensuring that state action does not cause the United States to
breach a treaty obligation. Yet the judiciary does not have the
same responsibility vis-à-vis Congress or the executive branch
because the Constitution explicitly grants these entities
authority to regulate foreign affairs, foreign commerce, and
national security. Due to this understanding of institutional
competences, the Court has deferred to the political branches
when faced with treaty-based challenges to federal law.
Deference in this context created the last-in-time rule, which
states that when there is a conflict between federal law and a
treaty provision, the most recent provision will control.97
This Article contends that the plenary power doctrine
extends this approach to judicial review to constitutional
93
Id. The circuit court opinion in this case focuses heavily on the treaty claims
and reaches the same conclusion. Judge Sawyer quotes extensively from In re Ah
Lung and the Head Money Cases to conclude that Congress has the authority to
“legislate in such manner as to control and repeal stipulations of treaties granting
this latter class of rights.” In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 434–35 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1888).
94
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600 (quoting Edye v. Robertson (The Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)).
95
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 362–66 (2007).
96
See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
97
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987). But see
Wu, supra note 43, at 596.
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challenges. This doctrine reflects the Court’s desire to defer to
Congress when faced with treaty-based claims and to defer to
Congress and the executive when faced with substantive
constitutional claims.
Invalidating the relevant Chinese
Exclusion Acts based on substantive constitutional challenges
would have limited the State’s flexibility within the international
context. In light of this broader concern, it would have been
surprising for the Court to defer to Congress when faced with
treaty-based claims but not when faced with constitutional
claims.
The plenary power doctrine, like the last-in-time
doctrine, seeks to maintain maximum political flexibility in areas
related to foreign affairs. This Article’s claim that treaty
enforcement doctrines have influenced and shaped the
development of the plenary power doctrine is developed further
in the next Section.
B.

The Plenary Power Doctrine: Extending Treaty Enforcement
Doctrines

The Court’s desire to maintain flexibility for the government
to make international political decisions stems from the Court’s
conclusion that treaty compliance decisions are political decisions
rather than legal decisions. The President is responsible for
carrying out treaty obligations pursuant to the foreign affairs
power and Congress determines how, or if, a treaty will be
enforced within the United States through the enactment of
implementing legislation.98 As early as 1798, Congress took
98
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
206, 210–12 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1996) (1972); see Wu, supra note 43, at
587. This reflects the process for non-self-executing treaties. As the Court held in
Medellín v. Texas, non-self-executing treaties that lack implementing legislation are
not binding in domestic courts and the President cannot make them so through an
executive order. 552 U.S. 491, 530 (2008). In 2004, the International Court of Justice
held that the United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
and as such, fifty-one named Mexican nationals were entitled to review and
reconsideration of their state court convictions and sentences. Id. at 497–98
(discussing the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31)). To abide by this international obligation, President Bush
issued a memorandum to the Attorney General stating that “the United States
would ‘discharge its international obligations’ under Avena ‘by having State courts
give effect to the decision.’ ” Id. at 498. The Court concluded that the President’s
memo sought to make law, which is a power explicitly granted to Congress in the
Constitution. Id. at 527. The Court did not, however, foreclose other means by which
the President can seek to comply with treaty obligations. Id. at 530. The Court
stated that “[n]one of this is to say, however, that the combination of a non-self-
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action to alter the international legal obligations of the United
States. That year, Congress declared that treaties with France
were “no longer obligatory on the United States.”99 After
specifying the ways in which France had breached the treaties,
failing to compensate the United States for its injuries and
refusing to negotiate a response for the breaches, Congress
declared that the treaties were no longer “legally obligatory on
the government or citizens of the United States.”100 The Court
recognized Congress’s power to alter international legal
obligations in 1884, holding that treaties are “subject to such acts
as congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or
repeal.”101 To modify or repeal an international obligation,
executing treaty and the lack of implementing legislation precludes the President
from acting to comply with an international treaty obligation.” Id. The President is
only precluded from “unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.” Id.
The President is free to “comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means,
so long as they are consistent with the Constitution.” Id.
Congress is responsible for enacting implementing legislation. An inconsistency
between federal statutes and a treaty reflects a congressional choice and such
choices will have international political or legal consequences. Any of these actions
can implicate foreign affairs, which is an area that the political branches have
unique authority and competence in. Any breach of the international obligations,
despite compliance with the implementing legislation, can authorize an injured
party to undertake countermeasures or pursue a legal claim before an international
adjudicatory body. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra, at 211. This is true even if the U.S. law
in question is the implementing legislation. To the extent the implementing
legislation conflicts with the treaty or does not comply in some other fashion, the
United States will be internationally liable for a breach absent an acceptable
defense. Legislative pronouncements “repealing” a treaty do not alter the
international obligations of the United States. Id. at 211–14. Historically, arguments
have been made that this power is held jointly by the President and Congress or the
President and the Senate. Id. at 211. The issue was addressed in Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), when Senator Barry Goldwater challenged President
Carter’s termination of the 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan without
senatorial or congressional approval. HENKIN, supra, at 213. The Supreme Court
declared the issue a nonjusticiable political question “because it involves the
authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations.”
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Absent action by the
President, the United States remains bound by its treaty obligations internationally.
Any congressional “repeal” is only effective with regard to governing domestic law.
99
Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578 (1798).
100
Id.
101
Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument
to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either
over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are
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Congress must express its intent to do so very clearly. Mere
inconsistency is not sufficient for the Court to conclude that
Congress has modified or repealed a U.S. treaty obligation.102
Since Marbury v. Madison, however, courts review
congressional action for compliance and compatibility with the
U.S. Constitution.
This is understood to be an essential
mechanism for protecting the separation of powers outlined in
the U.S. Constitution. Ensuring that U.S. action is compatible
with U.S. treaty obligations is similarly necessary for protecting
the constitutional separation of powers scheme.103 The Court,
however, has been reluctant to exercise the judicial power in
contexts involving foreign affairs or other political matters. This
reluctance is based on the idea that the institutional competences
of the executive and legislative branches better suit them to
resolving such disputes. This separation of powers concern is
reflected in numerous judicial self-restraint doctrines, such as
the political question doctrine, the last-in-time rule, and the
plenary power doctrine.104
Regulating treaty compliance vis-à-vis Congress is an area in
which the courts have decided that Congress is better equipped
to ascertain the consequences of breaching a treaty, and the
judiciary should respect such a decision because of the foreign
affairs implications. If the sovereign has decided that it is in its
best interests to breach a treaty obligation, then the injured
party must seek relief through diplomatic channels or
international adjudicatory bodies.
It is not, however, for
domestic courts to provide such relief. The provision of relief by
U.S. courts would minimize the ability of the United States to
take action deemed politically necessary and to speak with one
voice internationally.
In light of the international political implications
surrounding treaty obligations, courts have been reluctant to

inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other: provided, always,
the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456,
1464–65 (1988).
103
U.S. treaty obligations are the supreme law of the land along with the U.S.
Constitution and federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
104
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 262 (1962); see also supra text accompanying
notes 54–56.
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enforce treaty obligations in the face of conflicting federal law.105
As long as Congress acts within its constitutional power, courts
have upheld its actions, “even if they violate treaty obligations or
other international law.”106 In Taylor v. Morton, Justice Curtis of
the Circuit Court of Massachusetts refused to determine if the
1842 Tariff Act violated the 1832 Friendship and Commerce
Treaty between the United States and Russia.107 The treaty
provided that Russia would have most favored nation status for
tariffs. This ensured that the tariffs for Russian imports would
be the lowest tariff granted by the United States. The 1842
Tariff Act set the tariff for hemp from Manilla, Suera, and India
at $25 per ton and all other hemp at $40 per ton.108 Justice
Curtis recognized that states have the power to “refuse to execute
a treaty,” but the power to do so in the United States rests with
Congress.109 He concluded that it was not within the judicial
power to determine
whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign ha[d] been
violated . . . ; whether the consideration of a particular
stipulation in a treaty, ha[ving] been voluntarily withdrawn by
one party, [was] no longer obligatory on the other; [and]
whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested
through his representative [gave] just occasion to the political
departments of our government to withhold the execution of a
promise contained in a treaty, or to act in direct contravention
of such promise.110

Our courts have concluded that these are matters for the
political branches of government because they implicate

diplomacy and law making.111 As such, the judiciary should defer

105
HENKIN, supra note 98, at 214 (“Courts do not sit in judgment on the political
branches to prevent them from terminating or breaching a treaty.”).
106
Id.; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706–08 (1893);
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
107
23 F. Cas. 784, 788 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).
108
Id. at 784–85.
109
Id. at 786.
110
Id. at 787.
111
Id.
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to the political decisions regarding treaty compliance rather than
enforcing treaty obligations domestically.112
The plenary power doctrine reflects the same concerns that
the U.S. Supreme Court has with regard to treaty compliance—
flexibility in foreign affairs. The Court has treated immigration
as a foreign affairs matter not only because it deals with the
citizens of other States but because historically the federal
government regulated immigration with treaties. At the time
that the federal immigration power cases were decided,
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties granted the
citizens of the contracting State the right to enter and reside in
the United States.113 The use of treaties to regulate immigration
created a context in which the Court would be deferential to the
political branches of government.
The Court’s treaty
enforcement jurisprudence mandated deference to the executive
and Congress in the face of treaty breach allegations. The
plenary power doctrine extended that approach to constitutional
challenges. Just as the Court deferred to congressional decisions
to legislate contrary to treaty obligations, the Court would
similarly defer to congressional and executive decisions that
allegedly violated the U.S. Constitution in the area of
immigration.114 The Court’s deference in the treaty context is
based on the idea that treaty compliance decisions are political
decisions rather than legal decisions. Since the U.S. Constitution
grants the executive branch and Congress the power to make
such political decisions, courts should not review these decisions
in hindsight. Immigration decisions are similarly seen as
political rather than legal because they implicate foreign affairs,

112

Id. at 786 (“To refuse to execute a treaty . . . is a matter of utmost gravity and
delicacy; but the power to do so, is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived,
without deeply affecting its independence.”).
113
See supra text accompanying notes 17–19.
114
The early constitutional challenges of the Chinese Exclusion Laws claimed
that Congress did not have the authority to enact the laws and that executive
officials violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs by enforcing the laws.
In response to these claims, which have not been the focus of my discussion, the
Court articulated the contours of the plenary power doctrine: “Congress and the
executive branch have exclusive decision-making authority without judicial
oversight for constitutionality.” MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 27; see also Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 706–08 (1893). In Chae Chan Ping, the Court stated that the immigration
decisions of the political branches were “conclusive upon the judiciary.” 130 U.S. at
606.
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as demonstrated by the use of treaties to regulate. In both
contexts, treaty-based claims and substantive constitutional
claims, the Court did not want to limit the power or flexibility of
the United States when making international political decisions.
In the treaty enforcement context, the Court created
doctrines that reinforced the power of the political branches to
make political decisions even when those decisions conflicted
with existing treaty obligations.115
In the substantive
constitutional context, the Court took a different but related
route to protect flexibility in foreign affairs. Rather than stating
that these actors have the authority to regulate immigration in
ways that contradict the U.S. Constitution, the Court decided
that it would provide minimal judicial review of substantive
constitutional challenges. Judicial deference in this context gives
the executive branch and Congress space to make the necessary
political decisions, but it does not absolve them of their obligation
to uphold and defend the Constitution.116
Despite these different strategies for maintaining flexibility
in foreign affairs, the Court’s treaty compliance jurisprudence
created a context in which the plenary power doctrine was
required. In the nineteenth century, immigration was regulated
with treaties and was therefore understood to be a political
foreign affairs matter.
The Court’s treaty compliance
jurisprudence put treaties and federal statutes on equal footing,
thus empowering Congress to pass later in time statutes altering
treaty obligations.
When the government’s immigration
decisions were challenged as treaty violations, the last-in-time
doctrine insulated the government’s decisions. Because our
courts view immigration decisions as political foreign affairs
decisions, the same insulation was needed when immigration
decisions were challenged as violating the U.S. Constitution. The
plenary power doctrine provides that insulation by limiting the
review that courts will provide.

115

See supra text accompanying notes 54–56, 93–112.
See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002). The Court assumes
that Congress and the executive branch will regulate immigration in a manner that
is consistent with the Constitution.
116
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II. THE LIMITS TO PROTECTING IMMIGRANTS’ HUMAN RIGHTS
The plenary power doctrine has persisted despite the
decreasing use of treaties to regulate immigration. While the
legal tools used to regulate immigration have changed from
treaties to federal statutes, the perception of immigration as a
national sovereignty issue that implicates foreign affairs has
endured. Human rights scholars therefore seek greater judicial
enforcement of U.S. human rights treaty obligations as a tool to
bolster the judiciary’s role in monitoring deportation decisions.
Human rights treaties, and more specifically the jurisprudence of
treaty bodies, are seen as tools for undermining the veracity of
the plenary power doctrine. This claim ignores three significant
challenges: the status of the relevant human rights treaties, the
application of treaty enforcement doctrines, and the
indeterminacy of human rights treaties. The combination of
these factors prevents human rights treaties from providing an
effective check on the United States’ power to deport noncitizens.
This Part contends that bringing treaties back into immigration
reinforces the need for judicial deference to political decision
makers.
Common law judges around the world have utilized non-selfexecuting treaties and treaties that have been signed but not
ratified to confirm interpretations of domestic law, to resolve
statutory ambiguities, and as a source for constitutional
interpretation.117 This trend has motivated legal scholars and
advocates in the United States to seek greater judicial
recognition and enforcement of U.S. treaty obligations as a tool
for constraining the State’s power to deport noncitizens.118
117

See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 635–
36, 653–54, 660, 679–80 (2007).
118
Kadidal, supra note 11; Roth, surpa note 11; see also STEINER, ALSTON &
GOODMAN, supra note 11; Hathaway, supra note 11; Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L. REV. 853, 863–64 (1987); Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 11; James A. R.
Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 804, 805 (1983); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 965, 1022. Henkin and Nafziger analyze the classic international legal
texts to conclude that the power to regulate immigration is not absolute. See Henkin,
supra, at 863–64; Nafziger, supra, at 806–23. Neither scholar relies exclusively on
the development of human rights legal norms and rules. Rather these scholars argue
that the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that the power to exclude and deport
is absolute. See Henkin, supra, at 863–64; Nafziger, supra, at 823. While the

CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:10 PM

1248

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1219

Within the United States, the use of non-self-executing treaties
without implementing legislation has been limited to confirming
interpretations of domestic law. Even this limited use of such
treaties has been rejected in immigration jurisprudence.
Professor Waters has shown that common-law judges use a
variety of interpretive incorporation techniques to give human
rights treaties domestic legal effect absent implementing
legislation.119 Referring to this development as creeping monism,
Professor Waters identifies five interpretive incorporation
techniques that range from gilding the domestic lily to a
constitutional Charming Betsy canon.120 Gilding the domestic lily
refers to judges using non-self-executing human rights treaties to
provide additional support for the court’s interpretation of a
domestic legal text.121 Use of a constitutional Charming Betsy
canon refers to a much more ambitious use of non-self-executing
treaties. Through this technique, judges construe domestic
constitutional provisions to conform to international human
rights law.122 Human rights treaties are treated as authoritative
and binding sources for interpreting domestic constitutions.
Professor Waters examined the practices of high courts in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States in
addition to the British Privy Council in the Commonwealth
Caribbean. Of the five techniques identified, Waters notes that
the only technique utilized by the United States Supreme Court
is gilding the domestic lily. The Supreme Court’s use of this
technique has been limited to constitutional interpretation.
Gilding the domestic lily has not been used by the Court to
interpret domestic statutes or develop the common law.123 In
cases like Roper v. Simmons, Lawrence v. Texas, and Grutter v.

regulation of immigration may be an inherent aspect of State sovereignty,
international legal norms and rules place limits on this sovereign power.
119
Waters, supra note 117.
120
Id. at 653. The five techniques include gilding the domestic lily, developing a
rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon for statutory interpretation or updating the
common law, engaging in “contextual” constitutional interpretation, and developing
a constitutional Charming Betsy canon. Id.
121
Id. at 654.
122
Id. at 679.
123
Id. at 655.
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Bollinger, Supreme Court justices referenced international law to
bolster the conclusions they reached based on domestic legal
sources and traditions.124
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution prohibit the
juvenile death penalty.125 In determining whether or not a
punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, the Court
evaluates evolving standards of decency to determine whether or
not a punishment is so disproportionate that it is cruel and
unusual.126 Justice Kennedy cited human rights treaties such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (“CRC”) “as evidence of an international consensus
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.”127 Yet he also noted that
the international consensus “while not controlling our outcome,
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.”128 This sentiment was even shared by Justice
O’Connor, who dissented in Roper because she concluded that no
American consensus against the juvenile death penalty existed.
Nonetheless, she agreed that “the existence of an international
consensus . . . can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a
consonant and genuine American consensus.”129
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held that the University of
Michigan’s affirmative action program did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg
utilized international law to bolster the Court’s conclusion that
affirmative action “must have a logical end point.”130 She
discussed the International Convention on the Elimination of All
124
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
576–77 (2003) (discussing foreign case law rather than treaty obligations or treaty
jurisprudence to support conclusions regarding the scope of liberty); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
125
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
126
See Corinna Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA
L. REV. 365 (2009); Corinna Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1 (2007).
127
Waters, supra note 117, at 658. Scholars, however, debate whether Justice
Kennedy used international law to play a confirmatory role or used it determine
what the legal standard should be.
128
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
129
Id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor acknowledged this role
that international law can play in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but concluded
that no domestic consensus existed regarding the juvenile death penalty and “the
recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact.” Id.
130
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to
illustrate the international understanding of affirmative action.
Both of these treaties indicate that affirmative action measures
should be discontinued when the goals of equal opportunity and
treatment have been achieved.131 In Lawrence v. Texas, rather
than referencing specific treaties, Justice Kennedy cited
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to
support his conclusion that liberty protects the “right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”132
He noted that many other countries rejected the values
articulated in Bowers v. Hardwick, and that this right to “engage
in intimate, consensual conduct . . . has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.”133 In
each of these cases, the Court turned to treaties and treaty
jurisprudence to reinforce its analysis regarding the scope of
constitutional protection. Yet in the Court’s immigration cases,
these strategies have not been utilized.
Noncitizens have not been successful challenging deportation
decisions based on human rights treaties.
Courts have
responded to human rights treaty-based arguments by
concluding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review the
claim, that the deportation decision does not violate the treaty, or
that the last-in-time doctrine decides the matter. Most of the
treaty-based claims raise one of two arguments based on the
ICCPR. The first claim is that deporting the noncitizen will
violate their right to family life under article 17 of the ICCPR.
The second claim is that ineligibility for cancellation of removal
based on an aggravated felony conviction before the enactment of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) violates article 13 of the
ICCPR. Article 13 states that noncitizens facing deportation
131

Id. (citing The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, art. 1(4), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195,
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 4(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13).
132
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
133
Id. at 576–77. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Georgia’s sodomy law and held that the constitutional right to privacy did not
protect consensual homosexual sexual conduct. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled
by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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must be “allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and
to have his case reviewed by . . . the competent authority.”134
Similar claims based on the CRC and the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights have also been raised.135
When courts deny the claims based on jurisdiction, one of
two justifications is offered. Courts find that either the treaty
cannot be enforced in U.S. courts because it is a non-selfexecuting treaty or the treaty does not create a private right of
action.136 For example, in Beshli v. Department of Homeland
Security, the petitioner challenged his deportation as a violation
of his right to family life under the ICCPR.137 The court did not
reach the merits of Beshli’s claim. It concluded that the ICCPR
could not be enforced in U.S. courts because it is not a selfexecuting treaty and because Congress has not enacted
implementing legislation.138
In other cases, courts assume jurisdiction for the sake of
argument and conclude that the deportation decision does not
contravene the treaty.
For example, in Fernandez v.
Immigration & Naturalization Services, the petitioner argued
that deporting him would arbitrarily interfere with his right to
family life protected by article 17 of the ICCPR.139 The court
concluded that international law did not prohibit Fernandez’s
deportation simply because he had family members residing in
the United States.140 The ICCPR may require a “compassionate
hearing,” but Fernandez had a hearing in which he could
challenge the deportation.141

134
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(2), adopted Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 13 [hereinafter ICCPR].
135
See Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526–27 (N.D.
Ohio 2004) (CRC); Fernandez v. INS, No. 03-CV-2623, 2004 WL 951491, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (CRC).
136
See Naoum, 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, for a case in which the court concludes that
the relevant treaty does not create a private right of action.
137
272 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
138
Id. at 526.
139
No. 03 CV 2623, 2004 WL 951491, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2004).
140
Id. at *3.
141
Id. In this case, the court initially decided that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the treaty-based claims because the CRC had not been ratified by the United
States and the ICCPR was a non-self-executing treaty. Id. The court’s discussion of
the merits of Fernandez’s ICCPR claim is based on the assumption of jurisdiction for
the sake of argument. Id.
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The third way in which these cases are addressed is by
applying the last-in-time doctrine. In cases like El Zoul v.
Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services, Guaylupo-Moya v.
Gonzales, and Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, the courts apply the lastin-time doctrine to ICCPR claims.142 In each of these cases,
petitioners challenged the retroactivity of IIRIRA provisions that
limited access to discretionary relief from deportation for
aggravated felons.
The petitioners claimed that the
unavailability of discretionary relief constituted a violation of the
ICCPR right to family life. The court concluded that because the
United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 and enacted IIRIRA in
1996, IIRIRA “displaces any obligation assumed by the United
States as a 1992 signatory to the ICCPR.”143 Congress’s intent
regarding the retroactivity of IIRIRA is clear, and as such, it
displaces inconsistent prior treaty obligations.144
In some cases, courts combine approaches finding no
jurisdiction but also noting that if the court had jurisdiction there
would be no violation. As in Fernandez, the court in Naoum v.
Attorney General of the United States145 provided both of these
analyses.
The court started by concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the ICCPR-based claims because this treaty
does not create a private right of action, and as a non-selfexecuting treaty without implementing legislation it is not
enforceable in U.S. courts.146 The court then went on to conclude
that the deportation in the case violated neither the ICCPR nor
the CRC because the petitioner had been allowed to submit his
reasons against the deportation. While the immigration judge
considered the length of his residence and the citizenship of his
wife and children, he concluded that these factors were
outweighed by “significant and serious negative factors.”147
142
El Zoul v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 04-4349, 2006
WL 526091 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2006); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2005); Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
143
Taveras-Lopez, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 609; see also Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at
124–25, 135–36.
144
Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 129, 135–36; see also Taveras-Lopez, 127 F.
Supp. 2d at 609 (“[T]he congressional declaration controls and Taveras-Lopez may
not rely upon treaty or customary international law as the predicate for a
discretionary waiver from removal.”).
145
300 F. Supp. 2d 521 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
146
Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (N.D. Ohio
2004).
147
Id. at 528.
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Two important and notable exceptions to these three
approaches to treaty-based challenges to deportation orders are
two cases decided by Judge Weinstein. In both Maria v. McElroy
and Beharry v. Reno, Judge Weinstein held that the deportations
at issue would violate the United States’ treaty obligations.148 In
Maria v. McElroy, the Board of Immigration Appeals confirmed
an immigration judge’s decision that petitioner Eddy J. Maria
was deportable as an “aggravated felon,” and thus ineligible for
discretionary relief from deportation.149 Maria was admitted to
the United States as a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) in
1985 when he was ten years old.150 He had lived continuously in
the United States since his admission.151 His entire immediate
family resided in the United States, which included his parents
and six siblings.152 Both of his parents and two of his siblings
were United States citizens and his remaining siblings were
LPRs. In 1996, Maria pled guilty to attempted unarmed robbery
and was sentenced to two to four years.153 At the time that Maria
committed his crime, a single conviction for attempted robbery
with a sentence of two to four years would not have made him
deportable.154 Around two months after Maria’s arrest and one
month before his conviction, AEDPA was enacted.155 IIRIRA was
enacted several months after Maria’s conviction.156 Post-AEDPA
and IIRIRA, Maria’s robbery conviction made him deportable as
an aggravated felon and thus ineligible for discretionary relief
from deportation.157
Judge Weinstein examined whether or not the retroactive
application of IIRIRA’s aggravated felony definition violated
Maria’s rights under the ICCPR. The ICCPR protects an
148
Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), overruled by Restrepo
v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d and remanded by Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.
2003).
149
Maria, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
150
Id. at 213.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
At that time, robbery was a deportable offense if one was sentenced to at
least five years or one had a previous conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Maria had no previous criminal convictions. Id.
155
Id. at 214.
156
Id.
157
The statutory definition of an aggravated felony for theft and burglary
changed from requiring a sentence of five years to one year. Id. at 210.
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individual from unlawful or arbitrary interference with one’s
right to family life. As such, a noncitizen cannot be deported if
the deportation, “while in accordance with its domestic law, is
nonetheless unreasonable and in conflict with the underlying
provisions of the ICCPR.”158 Additionally, article 13 of the
ICCPR requires that noncitizens facing deportation “be allowed
to submit the reasons against his expulsion” unless doing so
would threaten compelling national security interests.159 Maria
was denied an opportunity to provide such reasons, including
interference with family unity, because he was deportable as an
aggravated felon and was ineligible for discretionary relief from
deportation.160 Judge Weinstein concluded that denying Maria
this opportunity violated the ICCPR.161
Judge Weinstein addressed this issue again in Beharry v.
Reno. Don Beharry immigrated to the United States when he
was seven years old from Trinidad.162 Beharry had resided in the
United States continuously since his admission.163 His United
States citizen mother and daughter and his LPR sister also
resided in the United States.164 Beharry was convicted of second
degree robbery for stealing $714 from a coffee shop and was
sentenced to two-and-a-quarter to four-and-a-half years.165 He
had previously been convicted of petty larceny, criminal mischief,
and second degree riot; however, he was never incarcerated as a
result of these convictions.166 Reviewing the ICCPR, the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and customary international law,
Judge Weinstein concluded that the ICCPR required that
Beharry have an opportunity “to present the reasons he should
158

Id. at 232.
Id.
160
Section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
excluded individuals “deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense
covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(i)” from 212(c) relief. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277.
161
Maria, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 234. Judge Weinstein also concluded that the
retroactive application of section 440 of AEDPA violated customary international
law. Id.
162
See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
163
See id.
164
See id.
165
See id. at 586–87.
166
See id. at 587.
159
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not be deported.”167 Failing to provide this opportunity “violates
the ICCPR’s guarantee against arbitrary interference with one’s
family, and the provision that an alien shall ‘be allowed to submit
the reasons against his expulsion.’ ”168 In interpreting the INA
“in a way not inconsistent with international law,” Judge
Weinstein concluded that Beharry was entitled to a
compassionate hearing.169
The Second Circuit abrogated Maria on other grounds and
overruled Beharry on other grounds, but in 2005, the Second
Circuit decided Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, which abrogated
Beharry’s treaty-based holdings.170 As noted above, in GuaylupoMoya, the court concluded that pursuant to the last-in-time
doctrine congressional intent regarding the availability of
discretionary relief from deportation for aggravated felons was
clear.
To the extent these rules violate the ICCPR, the
immigration laws, which post-date ratification of the ICCPR,
displace the conflicting treaty provisions.171
Claims that treaties can provide an effective basis for
restricting the State’s immigration power ignore two significant
challenges. The first is the Court’s historical reluctance to
enforce U.S. treaty obligations in the face of conflicting or
contradictory federal action. The second is the status of the
relevant treaties. The Court has refused to enforce bilateral
treaties explicitly granting individuals migration rights when
Congress or the executive branch has taken subsequent action
that limits or contradicts the treaty rights.172
Because
immigration is still seen as a political matter, the Court seeks to
maintain maximum flexibility in decisionmaking. The relevant
human rights treaties are either non-self-executing or have not
been ratified. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 and
signed the CRC in 1995 but has not ratified it. The ICCPR is not

167

Id. at 604.
Id.
169
Id. Such a hearing would also remedy potential violations of the UDHR’s
prohibition against arbitrary exile and the requirement that all individuals are
entitled to a full and fair hearing to determine rights and obligations.
170
See Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004) (abrogating Maria’s
retroactivity analysis in light of Domond v. INA, 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also
Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court
judgment due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies).
171
See Guaylupo-Maya v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2005).
172
See supra text accompanying notes 93–112.
168
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a self-executing treaty.173 As such it does not “automatically have
effect as domestic law.”174 The Court’s decision to apply the lastin-time doctrine to self-executing treaties like the Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation treaties, the Burlingame Treaty, and
the 1880 Treaty suggests that judicial enforcement of the ICCPR
would be limited.
This does not suggest that human rights treaties are all
together powerless in the United States.175 This Article has
focused on the specific use of human rights treaties, such as the
ICCPR, to bolster judicial review by U.S. courts of deportation
decisions.176 The distinctive way in which immigration has been
framed by U.S. courts presents a difficult challenge for human
rights enforcement. The framing of immigration as a foreign
affairs matter catapults it into a special domain in which
national sovereignty is implicated. Courts are not only faced
with treaty enforcement, which historically has been seen as a
political issue, but also with a domestic issue that is seen to be
inherently political. This double dose of political decisionmaking
in the immigration context makes judicial enforcement of human
rights treaty obligations harder than it would be in other
contexts.
The problems discussed in this Part present formidable
challenges to the use of human rights treaties to constrain the
United States’ power to deport noncitizens. However, the most
significant hurdle could be addressed through the enactment of
implementing legislation for the ICCPR. Then the issue would
become, what exactly does the ICCPR require and how can State
parties comply? Does the ICCPR only require a hearing in which
173
The FCN treaties at issue in much of the treaty enforcement jurisprudence of
the nineteenth century were considered self-executing treaties. See Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518–21 (2008). As such, they could form the basis of a legal
claim in a U.S. court. The Court never explicitly addressed whether or not the
Burlingame Treaty or the 1880 Treaty were self-executing, but the Court’s opinions
in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting treat these treaties as having domestic effect.
174
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504, 505 n.2.
175
For example, courts play an important role in enforcing treaty obligations by
deciding cases brought pursuant to the Alien Torts Claims Act. Courts and
administrative adjudicative bodies are similarly effective at monitoring U.S.
compliance with the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
176
I have chosen not to examine the effectiveness of using international forums
to review U.S. deportation decisions for compliance with treaty obligations. This is
primarily because the United States has not ratified the optional protocol that
grants the Human Rights Committee jurisdiction to review claims of ICCPR
violations.
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deportable noncitizens have the opportunity to be heard as the
courts in Naoum and Fernandez contend?177 Alternatively does it
require that adjudicators conduct a proportionality analysis to
determine whether or not the deportation order would violate the
noncitizen’s article 17 rights as Judge Weinstein suggests?178
Article 17 does not answer these questions; it provides a
standard for State conduct. The use of a standard—“[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
. . . family”—gives decision makers a great deal of discretion to
determine what constitutes arbitrary interference.179
The
indeterminacy of particular human rights obligations presents
the most significant hurdle to the use of human rights treaties to
increase judicial monitoring of deportation decisions.
III. TREATY INDETERMINACY
The limits that the ICCPR imposes on a State’s power to
deport noncitizens cannot be determined solely by the language
of the treaty. The ICCPR dictates standards that do not mandate
a specific outcome. Rather, the treaty articulates a combination
of rules and standards that grant State parties and adjudicators
varying degrees of discretion to determine what constitutes
compliance. This creates indeterminacy as to the required
outcome in specific cases alleging treaty rights violations. This
Part begins by detailing the relationship between treaty
indeterminacy and framing. Through this relationship, this Part
demonstrates the limited role that human rights treaties can
play in increasing the U.S. judiciary’s role in monitoring
deportation decisions.
It is commonly understood that a mix of rules and standards
are used to protect individual rights pursuant to domestic
constitutions and that domestic constitutions are often
indeterminate. Yet human rights activists and scholars rarely
acknowledge the indeterminacy of human rights treaties when
seeking greater domestic judicial enforcement of treaty

177
Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 (N.D. Ohio
2004); Fernandez v. INS, No. 03-CV-2623, 2004 WL 951491, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,
2004).
178
See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
179
ICCPR, supra note 134, art. 17.
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obligations.180 The assumption is that if judges took a more
active role in reviewing human rights treaty-based claims,
Rather than
specific outcomes would be achieved.181
acknowledging this issue, human rights advocates and treaty
body members often portray State parties advocating alternative
approaches to interpreting and applying treaty obligations as
defending noncompliance rather than offering legitimate
alternatives. There is a tendency to forget that the combined use
of rules, standards, and principles to articulate individual rights
creates indeterminacy.182 This indeterminacy creates space in
which a variety of outcomes are possible. The use of different
frames by decision makers to analyze allegations of rights
violations illustrates how States can legitimately reach a variety
of outcomes. Increased judicial enforcement of human rights
treaty obligations would therefore not necessarily lead to the
same outcomes reached by treaty bodies.
International law, like all areas of law, is subject to a certain
level of indeterminacy.183 The desire for universalism requires
structuring human rights obligations in a way that
accommodates a variety of national legal practices and

180
See generally Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A
Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139 (2006); Kadidal, supra note 11; Lori A. Nessel,
Families at Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies
Threaten the Immigrant Family in the European Union and the United States, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271 (2008); Roth, supra note 11.
181
This position fails to acknowledge the extent to which law and judicial
decisionmaking reflects rather than sets a society’s normative commitments. Absent
recognition that security of residence for noncitizens does not inevitably implicate
foreign affairs or national security, U.S. courts will continue to apply standards in a
manner that maintains maximum flexibility for the government.
182
See Karl Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction, 25 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 69, 99–100 (1991). It is not my contention that human rights
treaties are so indeterminate as to be useless. Rather, my position is that law as an
institution provides certain constraints on legal decision makers but that treaties by
themselves do not provide clear directives regarding outcomes. See infra text
accompanying notes 186–88.
183
Referencing H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, Koskenniemi notes that “[i]n
every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of
discretion by Courts and other officials rendering initially vague standards
determinate, in resolving the incertainites of statutes, or in developing and
qualifying rules only broadly communicated by the authoritative standards.” MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 36 (2005) (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136
(Clarendon Press 1994) (1961)).
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traditions.184 The use of standards and evaluative terminology
assists in achieving this goal.185 Commitment to universal
application recognizes that States will operationalize and
implement treaty obligations in a variety of ways despite
acceptance of a broad set of legal rules and principles.186 The
options available to States, however, are limited. Law as an
institution provides its own internal constraints on decision
makers.187 These constraints prevent human rights treaties from
becoming meaningless because of the indeterminacy.
The
188
indeterminacy here is relative rather than extreme.
Human rights treaties create a variety of obligations for
State parties. Professors Steiner, Alston, and Goodman identify
five categories of obligations: (1) to respect the rights of others;
(2) to create institutional machinery essential to the realization
of rights; (3) to protect rights and prevent violations; (4) to
provide goods and services to satisfy rights; and (5) to promote
rights.189 Challenges to deportation decisions implicate a State’s
third obligation to protect rights and prevent violations. Yet the
articulation of rights can take the form of bright-line rules or
flexible standards.190 Articles 7 and 17 of the ICCPR illustrate
this distinction. Article 7 of the ICCPR states that “No one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading

184

See, e.g., Klare, supra note 182, at 99.
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 39 n.72 (citing Wrongful Imprisonment for
Fraud Case, 72 I.L.R. 1987 (1971)); Klare, supra note 182, at 99–102.
186
STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 366–68.
187
The development of case law by treaty bodies is one way in which legal
institutions provide internal constraints on State decision makers.
188
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 590–96. Indeterminacy can be beneficial,
but it gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty regarding what constitutes
compliance with a specific legal obligation. On the one hand, the indeterminacy of
article 17 of the ICCPR creates space for judges like Judge Weinstein to conclude
that deportation proceedings must include individualized proportionality reviews.
See infra text accompanying notes 148–69. Yet it also allows for a narrower reading
of article 17 in which the deportation of certain categories of noncitizens is ex ante
deemed proportionate. Neither the text of article 17 nor the Human Rights
Committee jurisprudence dictates which approach is required. See KOSKENNIEMI,
supra note 183, at 590–96.
189
STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 187–90. Elsewhere, I have
referred to these treaty obligations and commitments as falling into three categories:
structural, programmatic, and legal. Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and
Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
781, 807 (2009).
190
See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 37; Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–59 (1992).
185
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treatment or punishment,” and article 17 of the ICCPR states,
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.”191 Article 7 establishes a
bright-line rule about a State’s ability to torture individuals; such
behavior is absolutely prohibited. State parties and adjudicators
have little discretion when torture is involved.192 Article 17 does
not create a bright-line rule regarding State interference with
family life—it does not prohibit all such interferences. Rather,
article 17 only prohibits arbitrary and unlawful interferences.
The use of evaluative terminology grants State parties and
adjudicators discretion in determining whether or not the State
has violated an individual’s article 17 rights.193 Determining
what constitutes arbitrary interference requires taking account
of a variety of factors. Frames play an important role in
determining how those factors will be evaluated.194 Human
rights obligations like article 17 do not dictate how States should
balance a noncitizens’ right to family life and a State’s interest in
deporting a noncitizen. The different approaches taken by the
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) and U.S. federal courts to
substantive challenges to deportation decisions reflect the role of
background norms, legal tradition, and governance structure in
determining how legal rules and standards will be applied in
specific categories of cases. While State practice and treaty body
jurisprudence may coalesce around more concrete interpretations
of treaty obligations like article 17 over the long-term, for the
short- to medium-term, we have significant divergence. This
divergence makes it difficult for courts to use the ICCPR to
definitively increase their monitoring of deportation decisions.

191

ICCPR, supra note 134, arts. 7, 17.
This does not, however, prevent States from contending that certain
“interrogation techniques” do not constitute torture. See Memorandum from John
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President
(Aug. 1, 2002) (contending that the interrogation techniques being used to
“capture[ ] al Qaeda operatives” do not constitute torture).
193
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 39.
194
The bar against unlawful interference also raises a few questions. For
example, is unlawful interference limited to interference that would violate domestic
law or does it include interference that is not explicitly authorized by law? The
discretion that adjudicators must exercise in answering these questions is narrower
than the discretion exercised when determining what constitutes arbitrary
interference.
192

CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:10 PM

2010]

THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES

1261

The debate within the United States about the State’s power
to deport noncitizens centers on the role of the judiciary in
monitoring and checking political actors. Article 17 provides a
potential substantive check on the State’s power to deport
noncitizens, but it does not stipulate who should enforce that
check or the scope of the check. Article 17 does not mandate
robust judicial review for allegations of article 17 violations, nor
does it demand proportionality review to determine
arbitrariness. Pursuant to the discretion provided by article 17,
the HRC has concluded that domestic administrative or judicial
adjudicators
should
review
deportation
decisions
for
proportionality.195 This same discretion could support the U.S.
approach of judicial deference to political actors. Current U.S.
law provides a mechanism for political officials—immigration
judges and the BIA—to consider family unity in a limited set of
circumstances.196 This could plausibly reflect the instances in
which deportation would constitute an arbitrary interference
with family life.
The arbitrariness standard in article 17 grants decision
makers more discretion than bright-line rules like article 7’s
absolute prohibition against torture. The availability of this

195
The same is true for the European Court of Human Rights, which has
evaluated similar claims pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”). Article 8 of the ECHR states that
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
Discretion is afforded to the State parties and adjudicators based on the standard
that interferences with the right to family life must be “necessary in a democratic
society” to promote specific state interests.
196
Immigration judges and the BIA are authorized to cancel the removal of
noncitizens when their removal will be in the best interests of the United States or
constitute an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the noncitizen’s U.S.
citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006 & Supp. II); In re
C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (quoting Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec.
581, 584–85 (BIA 1978)).
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discretion creates a context in which frames play an important
role in determining what factors will be considered in the
arbitrariness analysis and how the factors will be evaluated.
Frames are thought organizers and they “call our attention
to certain events and their underlying causes and consequences
and direct our attention away from others.”197 Lawyers utilize
frames as a key component of legal argument. Legal issues can
be presented in a variety of ways. For example, a State’s failure
to criminalize female genital cutting can be presented as State
protection and respect for freedom of religion or as endangering
the health and welfare of minor girls.
These alternative
approaches to defining the legal issue significantly impact the
decisions courts make regarding the applicable legal rules,
relevant precedent, and standards of review.
Good legal
advocacy requires defining the legal issues as advantageously as
possible. But it is the adjudicator who will ultimately define the
issues presented and he or she will utilize frames in making that
decision. While the advocacy skills of the lawyers will play a role
in how the issue is presented, other factors play a role. Some
frames will be more useful than others, because they resonate
with existing norms and values and thus appear natural and
familiar.198 Human rights treaties do not dictate what frames a
State party must or should use when evaluating a social or legal
issue. This is left to the parties to the dispute and the relevant
decision makers. Yet these frames play a key role in influencing
what questions are asked and how they are answered. Different
social histories, approaches to judicial review, and governance
systems cause different frames to dominate in different States.199
Thus, the usefulness of foreign jurisprudence can vary greatly.
The same is true for the jurisprudence of treaty bodies.
U.S. courts rely heavily on a national sovereignty frame
while European adjudicative bodies utilize a public order frame.
197
MYRA MAX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE: DEMOCRACY AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (2002); see also Banks,

supra note 189, at 792–93. Additionally, frames “organize and make coherent an
apparently diverse array of symbols, images, and arguments, linking them through
an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is at stake on the issue.” Id.
198
FERREE ET AL., supra note 197, at 70; see also Banks, supra note 189, at 793–
94.
199
A State’s governance system refers to the various ways in which States
allocate power and authority to different governance institutions and the
relationships between these different institutions in their ability to check and
balance each other.
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The names for these frames reflect not only the fundamental
question asked within each frame but also the source of the
immigration power in these States.
In U.S. deportation
jurisprudence, the fundamental question examined is how to
protect the United States national interests domestically and
internationally. In European States the key question is how to
balance the rights of the noncitizen with the State’s duty protect
the health and safety of its residents.200 Both frames are
concerned with protecting national interests, but European
courts focus on a narrower set of national interests, while U.S.
courts consider the broadest possible range of national interests.
The use of a national sovereignty frame by U.S. courts suggests
that any article 17 analysis would grant significant deference to
political decision makers.
Such deference in determining
arbitrariness may mirror the facially legitimate and bona fide
reason review applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel201 and Fiallo v.
Bell.202 In each of these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to
determine whether the government had a legitimate and bona
fide reason for its immigration decision.203 The arbitrariness
standard articulated in article 17 does not preclude or mandate
either of these approaches. It empowers decision makers to
determine what factors should be considered and how those
factors should be evaluated to determine arbitrary interference
with family life. The HRC’s use of proportionality review reflects
specific conclusions regarding the basis for the State’s power to
deport noncitizens, which government institutions are authorized
200
These bodies rely on proportionality review to determine the appropriate
balance between State interests and individual rights. The individual’s right to
family life is evaluated by examining family and social ties to the individual’s State
of residence and their State of nationality. Relevant factors for this analysis include
length of residence, location of family members, relationship with family members,
language skills, and employment history. See generally Angela M. Banks, Deporting
Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 489 (2010).
The State’s interest in protecting public safety is measured by the seriousness of the
criminal activity giving rise to deportation. The vast majority of the deportation
cases challenged before the HRC and the ECtHR involve deportation orders based
on criminal convictions. Id.
201
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
202
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
203
Both of these cases dealt with admissions decisions that were challenged as
violating the rights of U.S. citizens. Whether the Court would apply even this
minimal level of judicial review to deportation challenges raised by noncitizens is a
bit of an open question. However, these cases articulate the highest standard of
review provided by the Court to substantive challenges to immigration decisions.
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to exercise that power, and the role of courts and administrative
bodies in reviewing uses of that power. United States courts
have reached different conclusions on each of these points, and
calls for greater judicial enforcement of the ICCPR will not
necessarily bring about HRC-style proportionality review.204
Noncitizens facing deportation in the United States, Europe,
Australia, and Canada have challenged their deportation orders
as violations of their right to family unity. All of these States
have domestic laws that protect an individual’s right to family
life, yet this right as with many other domestic rights is not
absolute. Neither domestic law nor international law absolutely
prohibits State interference with family life—certain
interferences are permitted. Standards, rather than bright-line
rules, are used to police the boundary between permitted and
prohibited interferences. For example, as noted above, the
ICCPR only prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interferences with
family life.205 Within the United States, the constitutional right
to family privacy protects against undue State interference.206
Despite legal recognition of an individual’s right to family life,
adjudicators around the world have reached different conclusions
about the judiciary’s role in reviewing immigration decisions that
interfere with family life. Federal courts in the United States
defer to the decisions of the political actors while European
courts actively monitor and evaluate the political actors’
immigration decisions.

204

See Banks, supra note 200.
ICCPR, supra note 134, art. 17.
206
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that there is “a
private realm of family life which the State cannot enter”); see also David D. Meyer,
The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 547–48 (2000); Lois A.
Weithorn, Can a Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage That Was Valid at Its
Inception? Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California’s Existing
Same-Sex Marriages, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1119–20 (2009). What constitutes
undue state interference is a matter of some controversy. While the Court’s
jurisprudence discusses family privacy as a fundamental right, the standards of
review used by the Court have been something other than strict scrutiny. See Meyer,
supra, at 539–48. Meyer argues that the actual review provided by the Court
examines state interference with family privacy for reasonableness rather than
seeking to ensure that the interference is based on a compelling state interest that is
narrowly tailored to address that interest. Id.
205

CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:10 PM

2010]

THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES

1265

The deferential stance of U.S. courts is due in part to the
courts’ conclusions regarding institutional competences.207 The
discussion in Part I detailing the relationship between treaties
and immigration helps to explain why the Court views
immigration decisions as political decisions implicating national
sovereignty. As long as immigration is viewed this way there is a
“lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving” challenges to immigration decisions, or, alternatively,
it is impossible to resolve the challenge without making an initial
policy decision that is “clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”208
European courts did not face similar institutional competence
concerns because they did not view immigration laws and
regulations as distinct from other forms of domestic legislation.
States regulated migration pursuant to their authority to
maintain public order, which empowers public authorities to act
to protect public welfare, peace, and security.209 Judicial review
of government decisions regarding public order did not
necessitate judicial deference or self-restraint. As public order
decisions, the political branches of government are not uniquely
qualified or exclusively empowered to make immigration
decisions. Consequently, courts throughout Europe perform their
traditional review functions when faced with challenges to
immigration decisions.210 For example, in Germany, migrant
workers challenged family reunification restrictions as a
violation of article 6 of Germany’s Basic Law, which protects
family life.211 The Basic Law does not distinguish between
207
Foreign affairs and national security are matters that the Constitution has
committed to other branches of government. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
This creates a separation of powers concern that is amplified by the political nature
of foreign affairs and national security.
208
Id. at 217.
209
See, e.g., Roger Warren Evans, French and German Administrative Law with
Some English Comparisons, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1104, 1116 (1965). Despite the
use of bilateral treaties and multinational agreements to facilitate labor migration,
European courts did not view immigration regulation as a foreign affairs matter.
STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL
POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 101–02 (2009). See Banks, supra
note 200, for further discussion of the frame choices made by U.S. and European
courts.
210
See Banks, supra note 200.
211
Tugrul Ansay, The New UN Convention in Light of the German and Turkish
Experience, 25 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 831, 836–37 (1991) [hereinafter Ansay, The
New UN Convention]; Tugrul Ansay, Legal Problems of Migrant Workers, in 156
RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
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citizens and noncitizens and the German courts’ analysis of the
family reunification claims did not differ from its analysis of
other article 6 challenges.212
Increased judicial enforcement of the ICCPR in the United
States is unlikely to lead to the use of proportionality review in
cases challenging deportation decisions. The United States has
the legal infrastructure available to reach the same outcomes as
the ECtHR or the HRC when deportation decisions are
challenged as violating rights to family life.213 Our legal system
recognizes family privacy, which provides analogous protection
as article 17 of the ICCPR and article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Neither the domestic nor the
international legal protection of family life is absolute. States
are permitted to interfere with family life under certain
conditions, which creates a degree of indeterminacy as to which
interferences are permissible. The relevant legal standards
require adjudicators to exercise discretion in determining what
factors will be considered and how such factors will be evaluated.
The frames utilized by the adjudicators play an important role in
shaping how this discretion is exercised. The use of a national
sovereignty frame in the United States guides U.S. judges to
emphasize the political nature of deportation decisions, which
has specific implications for the scope of judicial review. This
emphasis would not change if claims were based on article 17 of
the ICCPR rather than the constitutional right to family privacy.
Framing helps us understand divergent approaches to
addressing allegations of human rights abuses. The insights
gained from viewing divergent outcomes as a result of framing

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 24 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980) (1977) [hereinafter Ansay,
Hague Lectures]. National courts in France and Germany limited the State’s ability
to restrict or limit family based migration. Virginie Guirdudon, European Courts
and Foreigners’ Rights: A Comparative Study of Norms Diffusion, 34 INT’L
MIGRATION REV. 1088, 1100 (2000). For example, in 1978 the French Conseil d’État
struck down a suspension of family reunification for noncitizens because it was
contrary to the general legal principle protecting an individual’s right to family life.
Id. Similarly, in 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany prohibited
Bavaria and Baden-Wurtenberg from creating a three-year waiting period for the
admission of noncitizen spouses. The court considered this measure a violation of
Article 6 of the Basic Law, which protects family life. Id.; see also CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 209, at 108.
212
Ansay, The New UN Convention, supra note 211; Ansay, Hague Lectures,
supra note 211; Guirdudon, supra note 211, at 1100.
213
See Banks, supra note 200.
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choices rather than as defiant noncompliance create
opportunities for developing effective compliance strategies. For
example, the use of different frames to analyze female genital
cutting (“FGC”) has had a significant impact on the way States
approach regulating the practice. In Egypt, when a religious
freedom frame was used to analyze FGC, the State was hesitant
to regulate for fear of impermissibly infringing upon individuals’
right to religious freedom. Once a public health frame was
utilized, the State had greater flexibility and legal tools available
to regulate FGC and enforce those regulations.214 Similar
framing decisions affected the quality of public participation in
the drafting of Rwanda’s 2003 constitution.215 Rwanda used a
participatory constitution-making process that lead to the
adoption of a constitution that enjoys significant public support.
The constitution facilitated women’s participation in the national
legislature but discouraged multi-party democracy.216 Gender
equity advocates and multi-party democracy advocates
participated in the constitution-making process, yet only the
former achieved internal inclusion in the process.217 Prior to the
adoption of the 2003 constitution, women had not played a
significant role in Rwandan politics. Traditional cultural norms
did not support women’s active political participation as elected
officials.218 Despite these background norms, gender equity
advocates were able to persuade key decision makers to utilize a
peace and unity frame when analyzing public participation.219
Due to other background norms, women were viewed as
conciliatory members of society whose skills and social
experience would be invaluable for creating a unified Rwanda.
This perception of women supported increased political
participation.220 As a result of Rwanda’s history with ethnic
political parties, multi-party democracy was seen as a threat to

214

See Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 405 (2007).
See Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict
States, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 105, 106–07 (2007).
216
Id. at 106, 157.
217
Id. at 128–30, 145–61 (“Internal exclusion exists when ‘people lack effective
opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to the
fora and procedures of decision-making.’ ” (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY 55 (2000)) (emphasis added)).
218
Id. at 149–50.
219
Id. at 156–57.
220
Id.
215
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peace, unity, and reconciliation.221 Despite claims by both groups
for greater political participation, the use of a peace and unity
frame privileged women’s participation and disadvantaged multiparty participation.
In both Rwanda and Egypt, framing
decisions have played an important role in shaping human rights
outcomes precisely because human rights treaties are
indeterminate.
Human rights scholars and activists who seek greater
domestic judicial treaty enforcement tend to focus on the
outcomes of foreign or treaty body jurisprudence. Less attention
is given to the role that social history, approaches to judicial
review, or the State’s governance system have played in these
adjudicative bodies’ legal analysis. While human rights treaties
attempt to reflect universal principles and legal rules, the
application of such rules in specific cases must take account of
unique social histories, approaches to judicial review, and
governance systems.222 To achieve lasting change within a
society, courts must root human rights-enforcing decisions within
the legal and social norms of the society. Importing outcomes
without domestically based legal analysis is a shortcut. The
deportation jurisprudence of the HRC and ECtHR offers the
United States an alternative way to think about the relationship
between noncitizens and the State. Current U.S. law provides
the tools for enabling the judiciary to play a more active role in
reviewing substantive challenges to deportation decisions.223 Yet
these tools cannot be utilized to achieve this outcome until judges
begin to use different frames when analyzing immigration

221

Id. at 157.
A State’s decision to ratify a treaty indicates its willingness to adhere to the
provisions of the treaty. The fact that as of February 2009, eighty-five percent of the
United Nations Member States had ratified the ICCPR suggests that these treaties
reflect a degree of universality. But see MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2002) (questioning the universality of the
existing human rights canon due to the lack of participation by a significant number
of the current United Nations members); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
621, 651 (2004) (discussing isomorphism as an explanation for treaty ratification
and domestic legal reform despite lack of compliance); Hathaway, supra note 11
(focusing on legal enforcement and collateral consequences to explain treaty
ratification and compliance rather than universal norms).
223
See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651
(2009).
222
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matters. As long as immigration is seen primarily as a national
sovereignty matter, judicial self-restraint will persist due to
separation of powers concerns.
CONCLUSION
When noncitizens like Mary Anne Gehris raise substantive
challenges to deportation decisions in the United States, their
claims receive scant judicial review. Despite the initial appeal of
using human rights treaties to increase the judicial monitoring
role, this Article calls the viability of this strategy into question.
The very doctrines that would allow U.S. courts to review ICCPR
claims are the doctrines that would require judicial deference to
the political actors. Even if our courts were willing to adjudicate
ICCPR claims, the judiciary’s use of a national sovereignty frame
combined with the indeterminacy of the relevant treaty
obligations would permit continued judicial deference.
Treaties were the primary tool used to regulate immigration
in the United States from the beginning of the republic through
the mid-nineteenth century. Through friendship, navigation, and
commerce treaties, the United States determined which
noncitizens could enter and reside within the country. During
this time period, the Court was developing a treaty enforcement
jurisprudence in which the Court exercised robust review of
allegations that state action violated a U.S. treaty obligation but
was extremely deferential when the allegations were directed
toward the federal government.
Part I of this Article
demonstrates that these treaty enforcement doctrines informed
the development of the plenary power doctrine and are unlikely
to restrict its force. Closely scrutinizing treaty-based challenges
to immigration decisions would have undermined the Court’s
efforts to ensure maximum flexibility for the federal government
in conducting foreign affairs.
The plenary power doctrine
enabled the Court to maintain such flexibility when faced with
constitutional claims. Based on this re-conceptualization of the
relationship between treaty enforcement principles and the
plenary power doctrine, Part II illustrates two significant
challenges to using human rights treaties to increase judicial
monitoring of deportation decisions. The first challenge is the
status of the relevant treaties, and the second is the historical
reluctance of U.S. courts to enforce treaty obligations vis-à-vis
the federal government. Human rights treaties like the ICCPR
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are non-self-executing treaties, and U.S. courts have declined to
recognize such treaties as having domestic force. When courts
are willing to assume binding force for the sake of argument in
immigration cases, they generally conclude that the last-in-time
doctrine prevails. U.S. ratification of the ICCPR in 1992 predates the most recent significant immigration reforms in 1996.
While these problems could be addressed by enacting
implementing legislation, a more fundamental problem exists
due to the indeterminacy of the human rights obligations. The
ICCPR does not dictate what constitutes arbitrary interference
with family life or prescribe a specific role for domestic
judiciaries. Rather, the use of a standard to protect family life
grants decision makers a significant degree of discretion in
determining what is and is not an arbitrary interference. Part
III contends that the manner in which this discretion is exercised
is determined by the frames used by decision makers to analyze
the legal issues presented.
Despite changes in the legal tools used to regulate
immigration, concerns about social cohesion, national identity,
and loyalty continue to shape the U.S. judiciary’s approach to
immigration issues. The dominance of a national sovereignty
frame diminishes the effectiveness of treaties like the ICCPR in
limiting the scope of the United States’ power to deport
noncitizens. The failure of U.S. courts to exercise robust judicial
review of immigration laws, regulations, and decisions is not due
to a lack of existing law protecting family unity or the
nonexistence of proportionality principles. Rather, it is due to
the Court’s desire to maintain maximum flexibility for
international political decisionmaking. The Court’s dedication to
this goal is attributable to two factors: its pre-existing treaty
enforcement doctrines and its use of a national sovereignty frame
to analyze immigration issues.
The jurisprudence of treaty bodies like the HRC reaches the
desired outcome for many of us concerned about the current state
of the United States’ deportation jurisprudence. Yet as long as
there continues to be different understandings of a State’s
experience with immigration, approach to judicial review, and
allocation of immigration authority, U.S. judicial enforcement of
human rights treaties will not achieve the same outcomes as the
treaty body deportation jurisprudence. Over-estimating the
influence of treaty jurisprudence limits the ability of legal
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scholars and practitioners to develop alternative strategies for
enforcing human rights obligations. In the immigration context,
more attention needs to be given to administrative treaty
enforcement strategies in addition to non-legal strategies that
can broaden our nation’s perception of immigration beyond
national sovereignty.

